[UNSC] Discussions on Bilateral Talks Overlooking Key Factors

Written by Hindustan Times

(Source: The Washington Post)

The focus on encouraging bilateral talks between India and Pakistan is commendable. However, more considerations must be taken into account.

“Things will work out.” The delegate of Norway’s comments on the importance of talks were emblematic of the UNSC’s attitude towards bilateral negotiations as a whole: blindly confident. After several hours of relatively fruitful debate on matters ranging from ceasefire arrangements to body cameras for military observers, the UNSC at last turned its attention to one of the most important issues at hand: encouraging peaceful negotiations between India and Pakistan, with the aim of resolving the claimants’ differences.

It is admirable that all delegates recognise that the Kashmir conflict is fundamentally a localised, bilateral one, and even more so that they have sought to find peaceful solutions to it. However, there is a crucial difference between being cautiously optimistic and being overconfident. The reality is that there are a multitude of very real reasons why talks so far have gone nowhere, reasons which most delegates have failed to perceive thus far. Here are two of them:

Unmet Conditions for Talks

Both India and Pakistan have resisted going to the negotiating table because of how they perceive actions taken by the other side. India has so far rejected talks with Pakistan, understandably because she recognises Kashmir as her own and is only interested in discussing the status of Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Pakistan’s refusal to take action on terrorism in Kashmir is another obstacle to talks, which India is unwilling to let go of. On the other side, Pakistan, too, is uninterested in continuing talks until India returns the special status of Kashmir.

However, the delegate of India has recently signalled a new willingness to engage in dialogues with no preconditions, stating in an interview that “such measures would only delay progress in our talks.” A similar trend can be observed on the Pakistani side, with Prime Minister Imran Khan writing in a letter that the creation of an “enabling environment” would be “imperative for a constructive and result-oriented dialogue”. Despite historical aversions to talks, it is clear that both countries are willing to try again.

The task of the UNSC, then, is to ensure that both sides can enter talks with confidence, knowing that the other party is just as interested in resolving issues as they are. India should make an attempt to decrease tensions by engaging with the leaders of Jammu and Kashmir, and consider their requests for statehood, if a restoration of Article 370 is off the table. Pakistan, too, should make an effort to combat terrorism in the region, perhaps through joint exercises with India. The UNSC can bolster both efforts through political pressure and support for counter-terrorism efforts.

Lack of Trust between Parties

The failed 2001 Agra summit between India and Pakistan was a sobering reminder of the realities of this conflict. On a very basic level, the two countries simply do not trust one another to make concessions and keep their commitments. This results in a vicious cycle: a lack of trust results in an unwillingness to hold talks, hence compounding the lack of trust, and so on.

However, it is not impossible to break this cycle. The UNSC should look at ways to rebuild trust without relying on dialogues, which have already been shown to be difficult to start and harder to end successfully. Like mentioned earlier, joint counter-terrorism exercises can rebuild a modicum of military cooperation between the two, and improve relations considerably. The recent recommitment of both sides to the 2003 ceasefire agreement was also a step in the right direction, and suggests that further agreements on demilitarised zones can set the right tone for more central negotiations on the Line of Control. If the UNSC is willing to throw its political heft behind some of these measures, India and Pakistan may be far more willing to engage in them.

Ultimately, the UNSC cannot take either of the two extremes it has shown itself inclined towards thus far. On one end is the ignorant optimism of Norway and Vietnam, which believe that the conflict can be resolved by “convincing both parties to focus on the happiness of Kashmir”. On the other is the careless indifference of the UK, which suggested that the UNSC should not involve itself in political affairs, and focus only on violence.

Both approaches are short-sighted: the geopolitical situation in Kashmir is undeniably nuanced and complex, but this does not mean that the UNSC has no role to play. The UNSC should follow the lead of India, the most involved and familiar party in this conflict, and support the trust-building measures and concessions that must be taken in order for talks to proceed. To do so otherwise, to hope that “things will work out”, is a recipe for disaster.